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Sheet 4.07Series 4 · IncidentsA free guide from Deimos AI LLCIncident · OVHcloud CLI · 2026-10-19Part of Wardlatch

Wardlatch · OVHcloud CLI · Check and fix · Free

GHSA-862f-55f5-vmvwDid you get the swapped OVHcloud CLI?

Only if you installed or updated OVHcloud’s command-line tool, ovhcloud, between 12:47 and 14:21 UTC on 2026-10-19. In that window the release files of versions 0.11.0 to 0.15.0 on GitHub were replaced with a credential stealer; OVHcloud counts about 250 downloads. The source code and the build were not affected. Don’t run your copy to check it: check its fingerprint instead. If it is one of the bad builds, delete it, install 0.16.0 and replace every secret the machine held.

VersionStatus
  • 0.11.0 to 0.15.0downloaded 2026-10-19, 12:47 to 14:21 UTCCheck the file
  • 0.11.0 to 0.15.0downloaded before or after that windowNot affected
  • 0.10.0 and older, 0.16.0 and laterNot affected
From OVHcloud’s advisory, published 2026-10-20, read 2026-10-25 (sources). 0.16.0 is clean, published from a signed tag.
AHow to check

Check the file, never run it.

OVHcloud says to compare your program’s MD5 fingerprint with the five bad builds, and to look in the temp folder for a folder the stealer leaves every time it runs. Running ovhcloud version to find out would run the stealer. Run Wardlatch from your home folder (after cd ~); it needs Node.js 18.17 or later.

Wardlatch · paste into a terminal
npx wardlatch@latest --incident ovhcloud-cli-2026-10

It never runs the program. It takes the MD5 of every file called ovhcloud on your PATH and compares it with the five compromised builds OVHcloud published, and it looks in the temp folders for an envchecker- folder followed by digits. It says EXPOSED (with what to do), SAFE, or UNKNOWN when it couldn’t look; on a Mac it skips other accounts’ temp folders, which it can’t open, without a word. It changes nothing and sends nothing.

By hand on a Mac or Linux, in bash or zsh: this prints the MD5 of every ovhcloud on your PATH, beside where it is, without running it.

By hand · the program’s fingerprint
printf '%s\n' "$PATH" | tr ':' '\n' | while IFS= read -r d; do case $d in "~"/*) d=$HOME/${d#"~"/} ;; /*) ;; *) continue ;; esac; if [ -f "$d/ovhcloud" ]; then if command -v md5sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then md5sum "$d/ovhcloud"; else md5 -r "$d/ovhcloud"; fi; fi; done

Then the temp folders:

By hand · the stealer’s trace
command ls -a /tmp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}" | grep -E '^envchecker-[0-9]+$'

On Windows, in PowerShell: Get-FileHash -Algorithm MD5 (Get-Command ovhcloud).Source prints the fingerprint, and Get-ChildItem $env:TEMP -Filter 'envchecker-*' looks for the trace. Wardlatch doesn’t run on Windows yet.

Exposed
An MD5 in the list below, or any envchecker- folder: don’t run the program again, and follow section C.
Not these
An MD5 not in the list, and no envchecker- folder.
Nothing
No lines from the fingerprint check: no ovhcloud on your PATH. A copy you keep elsewhere isn’t found: run md5sum (Linux) or md5 -r (Mac) on its path.
  • The five compromised builds, by MD5 (OVHcloud’s advisory): macOS Apple silicon 6f2f086239f3d88eb2750e871901927d, macOS Intel 347e65eb7f2d78d1c6872690272a6cc3, Linux ARM64 01f57206d37c28cf711677f612052913, Linux x86-64 301bff0b51980b9e76c93633e7cfd3bd, Windows x86-64 (ovhcloud.exe) 6a3cf153338c416169cda2fe704c8848.
BFixed version

What to install.

OVHcloud CLI 0.16.0 or later. OVHcloud says 0.16.0 is clean, published from a signed tag. Only the release files of 0.11.0 to 0.15.0 were replaced, and only between 12:47 and 14:21 UTC on 2026-10-19; those versions downloaded at any other time, 0.10.0 and older, and 0.16.0 and later are not affected.

CIf you’re exposed

Delete it, reinstall, replace every secret.

  1. Don’t run it. Delete the ovhcloud program, and install 0.16.0 or later.
  2. Revoke and replace the secrets the stealer could copy from this machine: cloud keys for AWS, Google Cloud, Azure and DigitalOcean; SSH keys; Kubernetes, Docker, npm and Terraform credentials; .netrc and git credentials. OVHcloud’s advisory lists everything it took.
  3. Treat the histories of the AI coding tools on the machine (Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Continue, Cody, OpenCode) as read.
  4. Updating doesn’t revoke a key that was already copied: replace the keys even after you install 0.16.0.
DLimits

What the check doesn’t see.

  • Copies on your PATH only. A copy kept in another folder isn’t hashed; check it by hand.
  • The trace is one half. OVHcloud says an envchecker- folder means exposure; it doesn’t say that no folder proves the stealer never ran. Check the fingerprint too.
  • Your own temp folders. On a Mac, Wardlatch looks for the trace only in the temp folders it can open, not in other accounts’: run it as the account that ran the program.
  • macOS and Linux. Windows is not supported yet; use the PowerShell lines above.

This page describes Wardlatch 0.1.9 and its incident file, ovhcloud-cli-2026-10.json.

ESources

Sources and credits.

  1. OVHcloud, GHSA-862f-55f5-vmvw, published 2026-10-20: the affected versions and window (14:47 to 16:21 UTC+2, 2026-10-19); about 250 downloads; the five MD5s; the envchecker- folder; 0.16.0 clean, published from a signed tag; rotate the secrets, delete the binaries, reinstall.
  2. Wardlatch 0.1.9, ovhcloud-cli-2026-10.json and README: what it checks, and the secrets to replace.

Credits · OVHcloud credits alink-tothepast, who reported the suspicious release through a GitHub issue, and thanks Ivan Kwiatkowski and the VirLabs.ai malware analysis platform (the advisory links no profile for him, so the link is to VirLabs.ai). All sources read 2026-10-25.

FQ&A

Debrief.

The questions this page answers, every answer open.

Q-01

Which OVHcloud CLI downloads were swapped for a stealer?

The release files of versions 0.11.0 to 0.15.0 on GitHub, between 12:47 and 14:21 UTC on 2026-10-19. The same versions downloaded at any other time, 0.10.0 and older, and 0.16.0 and later are not affected, and the source code and the build weren’t touched (OVHcloud’s advisory).

Q-02

How do I check my OVHcloud CLI without running it?

Compare the program’s MD5 fingerprint with the five compromised builds OVHcloud published, and look in the temp folder for a folder named envchecker- followed by digits. The check has the commands and the five MD5s. Running the program, even to print its version, would run the stealer.

Q-03

How many people downloaded the swapped OVHcloud CLI?

About 250 downloads, OVHcloud says: its advisory gives “~250” under its key figures, without saying how it was counted.

Q-04

I installed it in that window. What should I do?

Don’t run it. Delete it, install 0.16.0 or later, and revoke and replace every secret the machine held: cloud keys for AWS, Google Cloud, Azure and DigitalOcean, SSH keys, Kubernetes, Docker, npm and Terraform credentials, .netrc and git credentials. Treat the histories of AI coding tools on the machine as read. Updating doesn’t revoke a key that was already copied.

Q-05

Does Wardlatch check the OVHcloud CLI?

Yes. npx wardlatch@latest --incident ovhcloud-cli-2026-10 hashes every ovhcloud on your PATH, compares it with the five bad builds, and looks for the envchecker- folder in the temp folders. It never runs the program. It runs on macOS and Linux; on Windows, use the PowerShell lines on this page.